The literature on new goods and social welfare generally assumes that innovations are developed by manufacturers. But innovation by users has been found to also be an important part of innovative activity in the economy. In this paper we explore the impact of users as a source of innovation on product diversity, innovation, and welfare. We examine the impact of user innovation on inefficiencies that bias the provision of new goods, and find that most are either alleviated or non-existent for user innovation.
Introduction
Innovation by users -often freely revealed -is an important part of overall innovative activity in the economy. Ten to nearly 40% of users have been found to have developed or modified products in fields studied to date. However, this source of innovation has received only little attention in economics research. Indeed, to paraphrase Solow's famous quip, user innovations appear everywhere but in the economic literature! In particular, evidence regarding the existence and importance of product innovation by users has not yet been incorporated in the literature on product diversity, innovation, and social welfare. In this paper, we attempt to right matters with respect to this specific topic.
The central question addressed by the literature on product diversity, innovation, and social welfare is whether, from a societal perspective, a particular market organization yields too much or too little variety or innovation. Effects that would create both over-provisioning and underprovisioning of variety, such as business stealing and the consumer surplus effect, have been identified. Also, when new goods are considered as innovations that following innovators can build upon, intertemporal spillovers and a number of further effects appear. The net result is that the answer to this central question is generally unclear under any given real-world circumstances.
In this paper we analyze the impact on social welfare associated with products developments freely revealed by users. To do so, we separately consider the impact of adding this source of innovation upon each of the inefficiencies identified in the literature as relevant in this context. We find that freely-revealed product innovations by users reduce or eliminate most of these distortions, and conclude that innovation by users that is accompanied by free revealing is welfare enhancing. One important policy implication is that the social welfare implications of policies that restrict product modification by users, or that allow manufacturers to do this, must be considered very carefully.
In section 2 we review the literature. In section 3 we explore welfare aspects of freelyrevealed user innovations. In section 4 we conclude with a discussion of some implications of our findings for both innovators and policymakers.
Literature review
In this section we first review the literature on innovation by users (section 2.1). Next, we review the literature on the tendency of users to "freely reveal" their innovations (section 2.2). Finally, we review the literature on the gains and losses in social welfare associated with the introduction of new goods to the marketplace (section 2.3).
Innovation by users
Relatively recently, evidence has been strengthening that innovation by users is an important phenomenon within economies. Thus, it has been found that from 10% to nearly 40% of users have engaged in developing or modifying a product for in-house use (in the case of industrial products) or for personal use (in the case of consumer products) in fields sampled to date (table 1) 3 . Given the ratio of users to manufacturers in the economy, it is possible that most innovative effort and investment may well be attributable to users rather than manufacturers -largely unnoticed and untabulated in present economic data series.
This same empirical literature also shows that innovation tends to be concentrated among the "lead users" in a user population. Lead users are members of a user population with two distinguishing characteristics. First, they are at the leading edge of important trends, and so are currently experiencing needs that will later be experienced by many users in that marketplace. Second, they anticipate obtaining relatively high benefits from obtaining a solution to their needs, and so may innovate (von Hippel 1986) . The effect size found in these studies tends to be very large. For example, in a study of CAD software used for printed circuit design, Urban and von Hippel (1988) found that 82% of the lead user cluster in their sample had developed their own version of or had modified the specific type of industrial product they employed, while only 1% of the non-lead users had done this.
Both characteristics of lead users can be understood in economic terms. In order to exploit scale economies, manufacturers typically use market segmentation studies to determine how best to address heterogeneous user demand with only a few product variations. A survey of such studies shows an average of only 5.5 clusters specified (cluster analysis is the method typically used), with 46% of user heterogeneity remaining as within-cluster variance (Franke and Reisinger 2002) . In other words, many users are likely to be relatively poorly served by product solutions manufacturers develop to address to the average need of a market segment. Some of these users can find that it pays to engage in product development or modification to develop a solution that better serves their individual needs (Franke and von Hippel 2003) .
The concentration of innovation activity among lead users within the user population can also be understood from an economic perspective. Given that innovation is an economically motivated activity, those users expecting significantly higher economic or personal benefit from developing an innovation -one of the two characteristics of lead users -have a higher incentive to and so are more likely to innovate. Also, given that lead users experience needs in advance of the bulk of a target market, the nature, risks, and eventual size of that target market are often not clear to manufacturers. This lack of clarity can reduce manufacturers' incentives to innovate, and increase the likelihood that lead users will be the first to develop their own innovative solutions for needs that later prove to represent mainstream market demand. 3 In some studies shown in table 1, the proportion of users innovating in the general user population will be lower than that reported in the study due to intentionally-introduced sample biases. For example, the study of mountain biking by Lüthje et al. (2003) was intentionally directed towards mountain bikers who were members of biking clubs located in a known "hot spot" for user innovation. Other studies without such biases, however, also report high proportions of users innovating. Thus a study of the entire population of Australian libraries found that 26% had made in-house modifications to the computer software of the "OPAC" systems they use for record-keeping and patron information searches (Morrison et al. 2000) . On the basis of present data, therefore, it seems safe to conclude that "many" users do engage in product development and modification in many fields. Urban and von Hippel (1988) ; (b) Herstatt and von Hippel (1992) ; (c) Morrison et al. (2000) ; (d) Franke and von Hippel (2003) ; (e) Lüthje (2000) ; (f) Franke and Shah (2003) ; (g) Lüthje et al. (2002) .
In principle, all this innovative activity by users could be independent of manufacturers' innovation activity. But the fact that user-innovators tend to be lead users with needs that foreshadow general demand suggests that this will not be the case. And, in line with this expectation, studies of the histories of major innovations in a range of fields that were later provided to the marketplace by manufacturers as commercial products show that many were first prototyped by users. Fields for which this question has been explored include oil processing innovations (Enos 1962) , early computer innovations (Knight 1963) , machine tool innovations (Rosenberg 1976) , scientific instrument innovations and semiconductor and electronic subassembly processing equipment and sports equipment innovations (Shah 2000) .
Free revealing of innovation by users
Empirical studies show innovating users often choose to freely reveal details of their innovations to other users and to manufacturers as well. Allen (1983) found furnace design information openly revealed by iron producers in the 19th century iron-making industry; the practice has been found among users of clinical chemistry analyzer equipment ; Lim (2000) reports that IBM freely revealed information on its "copper interconnect" semiconductor process and equipment innovations to equipment manufacturing firms and thereby to competing users; Morrison et al. (2000) found improvements to library information software freely revealed by libraries; Franke and Shah (2003) found user-developed innovations being freely revealed within communities of sports enthusiasts. Contributors to open source software projects also reveal the "source code" of the software they have developed at private expense and convey rights to use and modify that software to others without charge (e.g., Raymond 1999 ).
When we say that an innovator freely reveals proprietary information, we mean that all existing and potential intellectual property rights to that information are voluntarily given up by the innovator and all interested parties are given access to it -the information becomes a public good. Thus, free revealing of information by a possessor is defined as the granting of access to all interested agents without imposition of any direct payment. For example, placement of nonpatented information in a publicly-accessible site such as a journal or public website would be free revealing under this definition (Harhoff et al., 2003) . 4 To economists free revealing is, at first glance, surprising, because it violates a central tenant of the economic theory of innovation. In this classical view, appropriating returns to innovation requires innovators to keep the knowledge underlying an innovation secret or to protect it by patents or other means. After all, non-compensated spillovers of innovation-related information should represent a loss that innovators would seek to avoid if at all possible, even at some cost.
Recent work seeks to explain free revealing by proposing that some forms of private rewards to innovators survive the act of free revealing -or are even enhanced by it. For example, code may be written precisely to suit the private needs of the code writer -and may serve the needs of free riders less well (Harhoff et al. 2003) . Also, the learning and enjoyment gained from actually writing the code -benefits which have been shown to be highly valued by contributors to open source software projects (Lakhani and Wolf 2001) -cannot be shared by free riders who only adopt the completed product. Nor can the private reputation among peers (Raymond 1999) or on the job market (Lerner and Tirole 2002) gained by an innovator be shared by a free-riding adopter of that innovation. When free riders do adopt and use an innovation that has been freely revealed, that action in itself can lead to significant private benefits for the innovator. For example, as has been shown in the case of open source software, others may then improve the innovation and update and maintain it (Raymond 1999) . Greater diffusion (greater "market share") can also yield advantages due to network effects (Harhoff et al. 2003) .
Product diversity, innovation and welfare
The issue of socially optimal product diversity has concerned economists for a long time (Chamberlin 1950) . A larger diversity is, other things being equal, assumed to be desirable. This may be so either because each consumer benefits from larger variety in his or her shopping basket, and/or because a larger selection on offer allows, on average, a better match between each user's needs and the respective consumed good. These beneficial effects of diversity are counteracted by the higher cost that a large variety presumably brings with it. Producing many goods in small quantities means scale economies are less fully exploited than when production is focused on larger outputs of fewer goods.
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Scale economies may be caused by specificities of the production technology and/or by innovative activity required to develop new products. More recently, the conflict between diversity and returns to scale has been somewhat alleviated by the introduction of flexible manufacturing (see, e.g., Röller and Tombak 1990, Eaton and Schmitt 1994) . However, while modern manufacturing technologies do shift the optimal degree of diversity upwards, the conflict persists.
The trade-off between diversity and returns to scale forms the basis for several modeling approaches tackling the issue of optimum product variety. Eaton and Lipsey (1989) subsume them under the headings of "address branch" and "non-address branch". Address models follow Hotelling's (1929) approach of describing goods, as well as tastes, as points on a line. Related to this is Lancaster's product characteristics approach (1975) . Contributions in this branch of the literature commonly assume that each consumer buys only one good; put differently, goods are not combinable. This means that diversity in these models is valuable because it allows each consumer to, on average, better satisfy his or her taste. In contrast, papers in the non-address branch employ utility functions in which quantities of several goods enter (Dixit and Stiglitz 1977 , Spence 1976a , 1976b . The most obvious interpretation is that of a representative consumer who values diversity in her shopping basket. Alternatively, the utility function may be the result of an aggregation of diverse consumer tastes (Anderson et al. 1988 , Hart 1985 , Perloff and Salop 1985 , Sattinger 1984 .
The literature cited above explains the higher cost of larger variety by production nonconvexities such as indivisibilities of fixed capital or development cost. However, the approach is static in the sense that implications of new product development for subsequent innovations are not considered. These are the subject of a broad literature on growth, innovation, and intellectual property (see, in particular, Aghion and Howitt 1992 , Arrow 1962 , Grossman and Helpman 1991 , Nordhaus 1969 , Oi 1997 , Romer 1990 , Schmookler 1966 . While there are (few) models in this strand of the literature that assume horizontal differentiation between goods (e.g., Grossman and Helpman 1991, pp. 43) , vertical differentiation seems more appropriate to the idea of technical progress. If new goods are superior to existing goods to such a degree that the latter become obsolete, then the issue is no longer product variety but rather innovation and technical progress. The principal trade-offs, however, persist (while additional ones appear), as we will discuss below.
The central question of all the research outlined above is whether, from a social welfare perspective, a particular market organization yields too much or too little variety or innovation. Researchers have identified effects that would create both over-provisioning and underprovisioning of variety, such as business stealing and the consumer surplus effect. When new goods are considered as innovations that following innovators can build upon, intertemporal spillovers and a number of further effects appear. The net result is that the answer to this question is generally unclear under any given real-world circumstances.
Welfare implications of user innovation
In this section we assess the impact on social welfare resulting from adding an additional source of product innovations -innovations developed and freely revealed by users -to the manufacturer source of innovations that has been traditionally considered in the literature. In our analysis we will separately consider the impact of this added source of innovations upon each of the several major effects that have been discussed in the literature as inducing either overprovisioning or under-provisioning of product variety or innovation (Table 2 ). We will find that the introduction of user innovation either eliminates or ameliorates deletrious effects under most conditions. Social welfare derived from an innovation is defined as the total surplus generated as a result of it. Some of this surplus is retained by innovation users in the form of consumer 6 surplus, 6 The literature on product variety and social welfare commonly contrasts manufacturers and consumers. In our case, adopters of the innovation under consideration will often be firms, not individual consumers. However, this does not affect our analysis. Hence, the term "consumers" as used in the existing literature corresponds to "users of the innovation" in our framework. some is captured by innovation manufacturers in terms of increased profits, and some spills over to other agents. By "innovation" we mean information sufficient to build a novel product. We will use the term to denote both minor variations of existing products as well as radically new ones. Also, we will refer to user-developed innovations that have been freely revealed as "public user innovations."
In the analysis that follows, we assume that both user and manufacturer innovators are solely motivated by their own utility gains and profits, and neither by gains or losses that their innovation might cause for others. 7 We also abstract from uncertainty by assuming that innovators correctly anticipate the cost and outcome of their activity. 8 Finally, we assume that innovations developed and freely revealed by users -i.e., the information describing the new products -are made available at zero cost and assume the marginal cost of reproducing the information is zero. Of course, adopters of a public user innovation will in general have to incur additional costs, such as those required to incorporate the innovation into existing machines or for installing userdeveloped software. We account for such costs of adoption by reducing the utility that an adopter derives from the innovation.
Inefficiencies due to above-marginal-cost pricing

Business stealing
By introducing an additional product to a market, an innovator diverts sales from substitutive products already on the market to its own product, thus exerting a negative externality on incumbents. A commercial innovator, selling its product above marginal cost, benefits from this negative externality of "business stealing". Since the diverted gross profit will, at least partly, be used to pay for the development and other fixed cost of the new product, this causes a bias towards excessive diversity and a related loss in net social welfare (Spence 1976a ).
The bias towards socially excessive product diversity resulting from the prospect of business stealing, present for commercial products, is absent for user innovations. Consider that a user innovator adding a new product to a marketplace may exert the same negative externality on incumbent manufacturers in a marketplace that was described above -or an even greater one, because the user innovation is made available without charge. However, the lost profits of incumbent manufacturers do not benefit a user-innovator (assuming potential sales to the userinnovator itself are negligible). They therefore are not spent by that user on product development costs. Instead, such costs are fully covered by the benefit the user innovator derives from in-house use of the innovation: if not, the user would not find it profitable to innovate in the first place. As a result, the profit loss to incumbents due to the introduction of the user innovation does not imply a loss of social welfare, but rather a redistribution of surplus to users. This conclusion holds independent of whether the user-developed innovations are used only by the user-innovator or are diffused in the marketplace. Now consider the reverse case: a marketplace with only user-developed products present to which a manufacturer-developed product is added. Depending on the relative quality of the goods and users' tastes, the commercial product may be preferred by some or even all users. However, while there is business stealing in the sense of "units adopted", there is no business stealing in terms of margins and profits, since the user innovations are given away at marginal cost. As a result, there is no negative externality exerted by the manufacturer on the user innovators. The manufacturer will only introduce the additional product if the surplus that it creates is at least as great as the cost of doing this. Hence, if the innovation is profitable, then it is also welfare enhancing. In particular, the increase in variety is not excessive.
Monopoly distortion
As we noted in section 2.1, user innovations are often made publicly available for free -and so a potential user only has to bear the cost of adoption. This is statically efficient if, as we assume, the marginal cost of revealing an innovation (i.e., the respective information) is zero. As a consequence, for public user innovations there is no dead-weight loss from above-marginal-cost pricing. A second positive welfare effect of public user innovations is that they might induce sellers of competing commercial offerings to reduce their prices, thus indirectly leading to another reduction in dead-weight loss.
9 Finally, it has been pointed out that prices above marginal cost can induce excessive variety by shifting up the demand curve for substitutes, which might make the introduction of the latter profitable (Tirole 1988) . Again, this inefficiency is absent for public user innovations.
Restrictions imposed on second generation innovators
Manufacturer innovators would usually price information sought by potential second generation innovators above marginal cost, by either charging licensing fees and/or by keeping the innovation secret or IP protected. This causes a static inefficiency.
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In contrast, a public user innovation can be freely used by agents other than the original innovator as a basis for new products and further developments, since it is neither protected by legal means nor by secrecy. Hence, the introduction of goods building upon the original innovation is simplified compared to a situation where the latter is brought forth by a manufacturer. This efficient use of the information describing public user innovations implies an increase in social welfare relative to a situation in which only manufacturer-developed innovations are present in a marketplace. Goods will be developed which otherwise would not have been, and/or the same goods will be developed while avoiding either licensing fees and transaction cost or the wasteful multiplicity of innovation expenditures that frequently occurs with commercial developments.
Inefficiencies due to restricted appropriability of innovation surplus
Consumer surplus effect
Manufacturing firms generally cannot capture all the consumer surplus created by new products they introduce to the marketplace. As a consequence, the number of products it pays them to develop tends towards sub-optimal levels. In addition, manufacturers will have a bias against development of products which only allow them to capture a small share of the surplus these goods create.
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User innovators make a completely different calculation with respect to the desirability of developing innovations -and this has the interesting consequence that user and manufacturer innovations will in general be of a different nature. Consider that an end-user captures none of the consumer surplus that its innovation generates for others, but does capture the full surplus that it generates for itself via in-house use. Thus, a user with a high and very inelastic in-house demand for an innovation will have an incentive to "price discriminate" against itself by investing a high proportion of its anticipated consumer surplus into the development of the innovation it requires. That is, users will tend to develop products having (so far) relatively small marketplace demandbecause manufacturer products are not likely to be present there -and for which the user itself has high and inelastic demand (very precise requirements). Manufacturers, in contrast, will tend to prefer to develop products intended for relatively large markets having relatively elastic demand. The consequence is that product innovations developed by users will tend to fill small niches of high need left open by commercial sellers -the two sources of innovation are complementary to each other. Hence, the introduction of a user innovation can have an offsetting effect to the tendency of manufacturers to underprovide product diversity to a marketplace. This positive welfare effect is strengthened by the fact that, due to user needs evolving over time, innovations created by "lead users" for market niches tend to become relevant to the bulk of the market later (see section 2.1).
Spill-overs to competitors
As we noted earlier, users often have an incentive to freely reveal their innovations, while manufacturers often have an incentive to hide their innovations to avoid loss of some of the surplus their innovations create to competitors. If we consider only the subset cases where both manufacturers and users seek to prevent spill-overs but spill-overs nonetheless occur, there is reason to argue that the resulting inefficiencies are greater for manufacturer innovators. Recall that a user innovator will usually tackle its own specific problems because, as was noted earlier, it is seldom in a position to capture any of the consumer surplus that its innovation generates for others. The more general these problems are, the more useful will be potential spill-overs to competitors. However, more general problems also make it more likely that some manufacturer will find development of the respective good an attractive business opportunity, supplanting the user's innovative activity. In contrast, again as was noted earlier, a manufacturer innovator will tend to develop products intended for relatively large markets having relatively elastic demand. This makes spill-overs from manufacturer-innovators more attractive to competitors, and more damaging to the innovator, than in the case of user innovations.
Intertemporal spill-overs
We now consider spill-overs to subsequent innovators, first from a user innovator to a manufacturer and then vice versa. Assume that a user innovator anticipates that a manufacturer, enabled by spill-overs, builds upon its innovation. The manufacturer might either develop a complement or modify the user innovation and introduce an improved substitute to the market. In either case, there will be no negative effect on the user innovator. Since we assume the user innovation was freely revealed (as a public user innovation), competitors had equal access to that good just as they do to an improved good introduced by the manufacturer. On the other hand, the user innovator itself often benefits from having a commercial vendor (or follow-on user innovators) modify and improve its innovation. In other words, spill-overs to subsequent innovators will often actually increase a user's incentive to innovate -which helps explain why user innovations are often actively diffused by their originators (Harhoff et al. 2003) . In addition, of course, there will be a social welfare increase resulting from a cost-reduction to follow-on innovators that benefit from the information spillovers from user-innovators. Now consider the reverse case. Suppose that a manufacturer anticipates that users might develop a substitute for or a complementary innovation or improvement to a commercial innovation it is considering developing -and that the user's efforts will be aided by information spill-overs from manufacturer to user. If the user exploits spillover information from manufacturer innovators to develop a substitute product, the net effect on manufacturer incentives to innovate is likely to be negative. Further, since users-innovators freely reveal their developments while competing manufacturers do not, the negative impact on the manufacturer's profits is likely to be larger than if the substitute had been introduced by a competing manufacturer.
On the other hand, if the user exploits the information contained in a manufacturer innovation to develop innovations that improve or complement the manufacturer-developed innovation, the effect on a manufacturer's incentive to innovate -and on social welfare -will in general be positive (assuming the improvement comes as an add-on, not as a substitute). Such improvements and complements will increase sales of the manufacturer's innovation and make it more valuable to users. Indeed, there are many examples in which manufacturers consciously employ a strategy to encourage the development of complements by users or other manufacturers. Thus, Stata, a software vendor specializing in statistical software, has created a proprietary "platform" product to which users can add new and better statistical tests. Users encode these in a software language proprietary to Stata. This increases the value of and sales of Stata's platform product. Add-ons developed by users that are freely revealed will increase Stata profits more than will equivalent add-ons developed and sold by manufacturers. As a consequence, Stata is more likely to innovate if it anticipates the likelihood of follow-on complementary and improvement innovations by users (Jokisch 2001) . Similar strategies are pursued by manufacturers of simulator software who provide tools to their users to develop add-ons Thies 2003, Jeppesen 2002 ).
In sum, we see that there are both positive and negative effects from intertemporal spillovers of innovation-related information in a world containing both user and manufacturer innovators. Manufacturer incentives to innovate -and social welfare -are likely to be increased if manufacturers anticipate that users will develop innovations that they can learn from -and/or develop complements and improvements to innovations that manufacturers develop. In contrast, manufacturer incentives to innovate -and social welfare -are likely to be decreased if manufacturers anticipate that users benefit from information-spillovers from a manufacturer innovation in order to develop a freely-revealed substitute. In net across the economy, we think that the effects associated with social welfare enhancement will dominate. As was discussed earlier, users-innovators tend to be lead users. Lead users tend to develop innovations that manufacturers have not yet had the "sticky" need information to develop and/or the market size incentive to want to develop. In such cases manufacturers will tend to benefit rather than suffer from spillovers from these lead user innovators.
R&D effect
The R&D effect arises if a new technology developed for one market can generate surplus in a second market. The lower the share of this surplus that the innovator can appropriate, the stronger the tendency towards inefficiently low effort to develop the innovation. This inefficiency is likely to be higher for user-innovators since we are assuming that they capture none of the consumer surplus that their innovations generate for others, but do capture the full surplus generated for themselves via in-house use. In contrast, a manufacturer will in general have some opportunity to appropriate surplus its innovation generates beyond the market for which it was originally developed by diversification.
Inefficiencies due to information asymmetries
It is commonplace knowledge in industry that many -perhaps most -new products developed and introduced to the marketplace by manufacturers fail commercially. Since much development investment is product-specific, this represents a huge inefficiency in the conversion of R&D investment to useful output. It is difficult to put a firm number on the proportion of R&D investment lost in this manner, because there clearly is some recycling of knowledge from failed to successful projects, some projects are deemed failures and stopped before commercial marketplace introduction, etc. However, studies of the matter clearly show the scope of the problem. Thus, Mansfield and Wagner (1975) studied the project portfolios of three industrial development labs and found an overall probability of success for new industrial products to be 27%; Elrod and Kelman (1987) find an overall probability of success of 26% for consumer products. Clearly, an improvement in this statistic would be socially desirable.
The primary reason for the commercial failure of manufacturer-developed products has been found to be inaccurate understanding of user needs by manufacturer-innovators. Mansfield and Wagner (1975) found that 62% of the technical projects they studied were terminated because of poor commercial prospects rather than technical problems. A major study of product pairs with very similar function -one pair member a marketplace success and one a market failure (Achiledelis et al. 1971 , Rothwell et al. 1974 came to the same conclusion: the primary cause of commercial failure was a lack of market and need understanding, not a lack of technical understanding.
We propose that the presence of user innovations in a marketplace will reduce this important cause of commercial failure of new products that are developed by manufacturers. Our reasoning is that individual users (individuals or firms) have better information about their needs than do manufacturers. After all, users are the generators of information regarding their needs, and the quality of this information can only degrade during the process of collecting it and transmitting it to manufacturer-innovators. The degree of degradation is likely to be substantial, because much of this information has been found to be "sticky," costly to transfer from one locus to another (von Hippel 1994 , Ogawa 1997 ).
How will this improvement in user need information for manufacturer product development be effected? As we saw earlier, much innovation by users is carried out by lead users. These lead users encounter needs that later are felt by many in a market -and a significant number of them innovate in order to develop a solution to their needs in advance of the availability of commercial solutions from manufacturers. Innovating users test their solutions in their own use environments, and thereby learn more about the real nature of their needs and appropriate solutions. They also often freely reveal information about their innovations. Other users then either do or do not begin to adopt that innovation and perhaps modify it in turn.
All this user activity gives manufacturers a great deal of useful information.
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They no longer need to understand user needs very deeply -instead they have the easier task of replicating the functionality of user prototypes that users have demonstrated to be responsive to their needs. User innovation and adoption activity also gives manufacturers a better understanding of marketplace potential. Projections of product sales have been shown to be much more accurate when they are based on actual behavior -information regarding early adoption and actual value in use -rather than on pre-use expectations by potential buyers. Monitoring of field use of user-built prototypes and their adoption by other users gives manufacturers rich data on precisely these matters and so should improve manufacturer commercial success records. (Certainly it is difficult to imagine a scenario in which this improved information would reduce manufacturer success rates.) Hence, innovation-related inefficiencies due to information asymmetries will in general be reduced by user innovations.
Restricted knowledge on the users' side about technical possibilities
While users often have an advantage over manufacturers with respect to need information and sometimes also solution approaches, they may well lack knowledge of efficient technical realizations both of the product itself and of processes to manufacture it. The resulting potential inefficiency is resolved, in the case of public user innovations, by manufacturers' building on and improving the user innovation.
Discussion
In this paper we have explored the impact of freely-revealed user-developed innovations on effects that tend to drive the economy to overprovide or underprovide product variety. We conclude that the addition of user innovation to models that have previously incorporated only innovations developed by manufacturers is likely to result in an increase in welfare. A central observation is that user and manufacturer innovations tend to be of a different nature, with product innovations developed by users tending to fill small niches of high need left open by commercial sellers. Hence, the introduction of a user innovation can have an offsetting effect to the tendency of manufacturers to underprovide product diversity to a marketplace. This positive welfare effect is strengthened by the fact that, due to user needs evolving over time, innovations created by "lead users" for market niches often become relevant to the bulk of the market later.
Given that user innovation is welfare enhancing, policymakers may find it useful to encourage product (and process and service) development and modification by users followed by free revealing. In this section we consider positive steps that can be taken to this end, and social policies likely to have negative impacts that should be avoided. We conclude that manufacturers can also enhance their benefits from user innovation by developing strategies that integrate user innovation more closely (and consciously) with their own product development efforts.
Implications for social policy
Currently, manufacturer firms are rewarded for their innovative activity by R&D subsidies and tax credits. Ignoring the issue of the optimal level of this support, we want to point out the strong discrepancy that exists between the high importance of user innovations for the economyas evidenced by the number of important commercialized innovations whose roots can be traced to user-developed prototyping and learning by doing -and the low level of public support they receive. This at least raises the question as to whether tax dollars paid for having yet another IT firm develop yet another proprietary "me too" software product might be better spent on incenting additional user innovation. 13 Bresnahan and Greenstein (1996a) make a similar point. They investigate of the role of "co-invention" in users' move from mainframe to client-server architecture.
14 By co-invention they mean organizational changes and innovations developed and implemented by users that are required to take full advantage of that new invention. The authors point out the high importance that co-invention has for realizing social returns from innovation. They consider the federal government's support for creating "national information infrastructures" as insufficient or misallocated, since "[co-invention] is the bottleneck for social returns and likely the highest value locus for noncommercially motivated invention." (p. 69).
If a user innovation is kept private then it leads potentially to even more duplicative work and less subsequent innovations than a comparable manufacturer innovation, since the latter will more likely be sold or licensed. To avoid the welfare loss this entails, public policy should think about how to strengthen users' incentives both to innovate and to freely reveal their innovations when this behavior is not already present due to insufficient reward.
Policymaking for other purposes should also be examined for any deleterious side effects on user innovation, such as are present in current technical and legal efforts to prevent users from reverse-engineering manufacturer-supplied products or modifying them. Users often modify existing products to serve as low-cost components for their own novel prototypes. Technical barriers inserted by manufacturers such as controls to prevent the refilling of manufacturersupplied ink-jet printer cartridges with low-cost ink can also prevent other forms of user activity such as innovation by users who wish to fill them with novel materials for novel applications. Similarly, efforts to prevent copying of digital information such as the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) can prevent users from modifying and adapting existing material to new purposes (Varian 2002) .
In a more generally context, Benkler (2002) argues that institutional changes strengthening intellectual property protection tend to foster concentration and homogenization of information production. This happens to the detriment of alternative (and complementing) information production strategies. User innovations are a case in point, or even the case in point. Lessig (2001) and Boldrin and Levine (2002) arrive at a similarly negative valuation of overly strong IP protection.
Implications for product manufacturers
We have seen that user innovations in general have both positive and negative sides for a manufacturer who offers a commercial partial or full substitute to the user-developed product. On the positive side, we have argued that there are cost savings when a manufacturer develops a product after a user innovation has been made available. Since the later will often be freely revealed, the manufacturer can build upon information about needs and solutions developed by the innovating user. Importantly, manufacturers -that currently devote at least 50% of their innovation-related efforts to products that fail commercially when introduced to the marketplacegain "free market research" from observing user product prototyping, product use and product adoption activities.
However, we also saw that the presence of user innovations can also affect manufacturers negatively, because they represent increased market competition.
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When a user-developed product and a commercial substitute exist alongside, some buyers might prefer the user development, causing a loss of market share and profit to the manufacturer. The profit maximizing price will, in general, be below the monopoly level (but could be higher in particular cases). And even if, at the profit maximizing price, no one prefers the user development, it might still be so attractive for some users that it restricts the manufacturer's pricing power. Finally, the mere threat of users developing a free substitute limits the manufacturer's pricing power, similar to the way a threat of entry works in the theory of contestable markets (Baumol et al. 1982) . In particular, this means that price discrimination (which is likely to be difficult anyway) becomes harder, because those users with a high willingness to pay might find innovating for themselves an attractive alternative.
The impact of a reduction in a manufacturer's pricing power might be particularly significant for manufacturers that create "platform" products linked to separately-sold enhancements or complementary products. Often, a manufacturer of such a product will want to sell the platform -the razor, the ink-jet printer, or the video-game player -at a low margin or a loss, and then price the add-ons at a much higher margin. Obviously, this strategy will work less well if users can develop free add-ons for the same platform. However, the overall effect depends on details: the availability of user-developed add-ons may indirectly increase demand for commercial add-ons for which no free substitute exists, thus again benefiting the manufacturer.
15 Saint-Paul (2001) focuses on this issue in a model of growth and innovation, finding that "philanthropical" innovation -developed and diffused for free, without any profit motive -may even reduce growth and welfare. However, his assumptions differ from ours, and they do not fit the real-world cases we are studying. First, user innovators are not philanthropists, but profit-oriented economic agents; second, their innovations and those of manufacturers tend to be of a complementary nature, as we have seen.
If the possibility of free add-ons developed and made generally-available by users makes development of a platform unprofitable for a manufacturer, social welfare can thereby be reduced. However, it is only the razor vs blade pricing scheme that may become unprofitable. If the manufacturer makes positive margins on the platform, then the availability of user-developed addons has an additional positive effect: it increases the value of the platform to users, and so allows manufacturers to charge higher margins on it and/or sell more units. Indeed, manufacturers can profit by taking proactive steps to make their platform more hospitable to user-developed add-ons ("this platform is "open"") and thus more valuable to users. Such a strategy is systematically pursued, e.g., in the cases of STATA and simulator software mentioned above.
